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Do We Value Mobility?
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Abstract Is there a trade-o between people's preference for income equality
and income mobility? Testing for the existence of such a trade-o is dicult
because mobility is a multifaceted concept. We analyse results from a question-
naire experiment based on simple precise concepts of income inequality and
income mobility. We nd no direct trade-o in preference between mobility and
equality, but an indirect trade-o, applying when more income mobility can
only be obtained at the expense of some income inequality. Mobility preference
 but not equality preference  appears to be driven by personal experience of
mobility.
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1 Introduction
Do people value income mobility along with other apparently desirable eco-
nomic objectives? In contrast to the extensive literature on simple distri-
butional comparisons in terms of inequality, poverty and social welfare, the
welfare-economic basis underlying preferences for income mobility is not clear.
It may be that there is a connection between mobility and equality of oppor-
tunity and that greater income mobility is thus socially desirable, but there
is no single accepted formal argument to establish this. Nevertheless there is,
perhaps, an accepted consensus that greater mobility in society is a good
thing and so it makes sense to see whether people do indeed value this good
thing in the way that we suppose that they do. The contribution of this paper
is to suggest a way of characterising a trade-o between mobility and other
apparently desirable social objectives and of looking at the factors which may
predispose people to value mobility particularly highly.
Income mobility is a topic that crosses disciplines which partly explains the
diculty of nding a way of appraising a unique formal notion of mobility (Van
de gaer et al. 2001, Formby et al. 2004). While sociologists and statisticians
are especially interested in measuring mobility in the abstract,1 economists
are often interested in judging and evaluating income mobility from a welfare-
based perspective. In the theoretical literature this is done either using explicit
welfare functions or axiomatic approaches.2 Our analysis has both normative
and empirical content: it is based on a questionnaire study and is rooted in
empirical social choice.3 Its premise is that in the debates about principles of
social justice it is important to engage with the way people actually think,
both in order to avoid becoming hostage of scientic conventions and because
it is real people who bear the consequences of decisions based on untested
normative principles.
Can we nd a way of eliciting people's preferences for intergenerational
mobility? We suggest that it is appropriate to try to nd a context-free way
of representing the problem similar to the way that is done when making
inequality or welfare comparisons using principles of distributional dominance.
However, we need to go carefully here because, although multidimensional
versions of dominance principles are available, it is not clear that these formal
results are particularly illuminating in terms of what is commonly understood
by income mobility. Furthermore, if we want to understand whether people
value mobility it is useful to have a representation of the problem that allows
both for clear mobility comparisons and for a trade-o against some other
1 Prais (1955), Rogo (1953), Duncan (1966), Goldthorpe (1980), Conlisk (1990).
2 For welfare approaches see Atkinson (1981), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982);
Chakravarty et al. (1985), Dardanoni (1993), Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002), Markandya
(1982); for axiomatic approaches see Shorrocks (1978), Cowell (1985), Cowell and Flachaire
(2011), Fields and Ok (1996), Mitra and Ok (1998), D'Agostino and Dardanoni (2009).
3 See Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012), the seminal articles by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984),
Amiel and Cowell (1992) and the overviews in Amiel (1999) and Konow (2003). For com-
plementary studies using the experimental method see e.g., Traub et al. (2005), Krawczyk
(2010), and Cappelen et al. (2010).
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social goal. In our questionnaire we focus on intergenerational income mobility
and we suggest a method of investigating a possible trade-o between mobility
and equality in people's preferences.
Intergenerational mobility is also a central issue in distributive justice de-
bates: how should one account for accidents of birth when seeking a just dis-
tribution of nal outcomes? Some argue that only income inequalities arising
from dierences at birth should be a cause for concern. In our approach we
contrast the liberal position that all forms of income dierences are equally
unjustied unless they go to the advantage of the least well-o people and
also with intermediate positions. We identify meritocratic views that allow in-
come inequality to the extent that it serves the purpose of rewarding talent or
desert: this position does not necessarily imply an ethical substitution between
income mobility and income equality.4
In a real-world society there are several complex interactions between in-
tergenerational mobility and economic inequality that may be dicult to con-
sider in a questionnaire. Among other things, there is a very large literature
both in economics and in sociology studying the interaction between mobility
and inequality during the course of economic development and focusing on
the process of formation of social classes and their mixing (see, e.g., Galor
and Moav 2006, as an example of a recent study in the economics literature;
see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, as a classical one in sociology). The study
of intergenerational mobility in connection with the evolution of the general
structure of the society is not in the purpose of our study. This is because we
are interested in analysing key distributional principles. In our approach the
distinction between rich and poor does not refer to capitalists and workers; nor
to other distinctions based on people's functional roles. We employ a notion
of mobility based on the comparison between parents' and children's personal
distributions of income, not functional or occupational. For the same reason
we do not consider the possible distinction between the role of nature versus
nurture in the mechanism of income transmission; and we focus on relative
income positions of parents and children, rather than on concepts that have
an absolute signicance such as poverty or auence.
Nevertheless, because dierent assumptions may be made in dierent cul-
tures about the nature of mobility and the importance of mobility versus
equality, we conducted the questionnaire in three dierent countries to check
whether the answers to the questionnaire are consistent or there are varia-
tions between samples. The three countries  UK, Italy and Israel  provide
an interesting mixture of societies with dierent experiences of inequality and
mobility (see Breen and Luijxk 2004, and below).
There is also a recent wave of empirical studies that analyse the way pref-
erences for policies that equalize incomes are aected by factors related to
4 Underlying the liberal position is the view that identies income mobility with equality
of opportunity (Stokey 1998, p.161). However equality of opportunity has a variety of
interpretations: it is used in the egalitarian literature to describe a situation of procedural
equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971) or to represent the ideal of an egalitarianism tempered
by responsibility (Dworkin 1981, Roemer 1998).
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mobility (see for example, Fong 2001, Corneo and Grüner 2002, Alesina and
La Ferrara 2005, Isaksson and Lindskog 2009). This literature, associated with
the theoretical approaches in Hirschman (1973), Piketty (1995), Benabou and
Ok (2001), typically nds that support for an equalization of income expressed
in social surveys is aected by people's prospects of upwards mobility and by
other factors which are generally thought to promote mobility. So part of our
analysis focuses on the possible eect of characteristics both of the respon-
dents and of the samples on abstract preferences of people for mobility and
for equality.
The relationships between economic inequality and intergenera-
tional mobility is also very important for public policy. Indeed, a
very hot topic in the current political economy debates is whether
governments should pursue policies that promote equality of oppor-
tunities more than policies that pursue equality of outcomes, or vice
versa (OECD 2011). For example, should the governments increase
resources devoted to traditional redistributive policies to reduce ex-
post income gaps or should increase the free provision of high-quality
public services (e.g., in education, health, family services, etc.) to
favour mobility? Our questionnaire has in principle some relevance
also for this discussion and it provides some evidence on students
attitudes on the two approaches. At the same time, various rea-
sons prevent to establish a too simple connection between abstract
preferences for inequality and mobility and their implications for
public policy. This is because, in addition to ethical values, the ef-
fects of public policies on the matters (and the opinions of people on
them) also depend on the causal factors that one believes drive the
mechanism of intergenerational income transmissions. As already
remarked, our analysis abstracts from the possible complex inter-
actions between intergenerational mobility and economic inequality
occurring in the real world. For example, while our questionnaire fo-
cusses on the ethical trade-o between equality and mobility, there
is a body of evidence on a so called Great Gatsby curve indicating
that intergenerational mobility and income inequality are often pos-
itively correlated (Corak 2013).5 In such a case, disentangling the
eects of policies that promote equality of outcomes or equality of
opportunities may become particularly problematic. In the conclu-
sion, after presenting the results of the questionnaire, we will devote
5 The term Great Gatsby curve was used for the rst time by Krueger (2012),
in a speech delivered to the Center for American Congress. The evidence is at-
tracting a harsh debate, particularly in the US. For some, the curve simply
rejects on empirical ground the idea that income inequality is acceptable as
long as there is income mobility, since it shows that more inequality of income
in the present is likely to make family background play a stronger role in deter-
mining the adult outcome of young people. For others, the evidence is neither
particularly surprising nor suggestive of any specic conclusions or policy rec-
ommendations since it only reects dierent degrees of heterogeneity in the
ability of people of dierent countries.
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Cl Ch Parents' margins
Pl nll nlh nl: = nll + nlh
Ph nhl nhh nh: = nhl + nhh
Children's margins n:l = nll + nhl n:h = nlh + nhh
Fig. 1 A 2 2 mobility table
a discussion also to this important policy problem with an eye also
to future research.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main
theoretical ideas analysed in the questionnaire. Section 3 explains the approach
adopted to elicit people's views and perceptions of mobility and describes the
samples used for our study. Sections 4 and 5 examine the results.
2 Welfare economics, income distribution and mobility
Our approach involves hypothetical questions and judgments expressed from
the standpoint of an uninvolved external observer.6 Using hypothetical ques-
tions without personal involvement encourages coherent thinking about social
mobility comparisons in the abstract, which by their multidimensional nature
are intrinsically more problematic than pure inequality comparisons.
We take a standard framework in which there are n dynasties in society,
living for two periods: in a typical dynasty the parent is alive in period 0 and
the child in period 1. The whole structure of the society can be represented
by the joint distribution H(P;C) of the pair of random variables P and C for,
respectively, parents' and children's incomes. In particular, the joint distribu-
tion H(P;C) contains all the relevant information to study inequality within
each generation, mobility between generations and the interplay between the
two.
Assume that within each generation income can take only two values: Pl
and Ph for parents' low and high incomes, respectively; Cl and Ch for children's
incomes. The joint distribution for this simple case can then be represented
by the 2  2 mobility table in Figure 1. Here nij denotes the number of dy-
nasties with parents belonging to category i and children to category j, withP
i
P
j nij = n and i; j 2 l; h. Dividing nij by n gives the relative frequency
of children in class j with parents in class i, an estimate of the probability of
transition from class i to class j. The row and column sums ni: and n:j give
the absolute frequencies of the marginal distributions of parents' and children's
incomes, respectively.
6 This is consistent with David Hume and Adam Smith who argued that the sympathy
and impartiality required to discuss distributive justice can only be obtained by putting some
distance between the social decision maker and the persons whose welfare is to be evaluated
(Bernasconi 2002, Bosmans and Schokkaert 2004, Amiel et al. 2009, Konow 2009).
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Society X Society Y
Children Children
$600 $1000 $400 $1200
Parents
$200 10 0 10
Parents
$200 10 0 10
$600 0 10 10 $600 0 10 10
10 10 10 10
Fig. 2 Two tables with dierent static inequality and the same rigidity
The marginal distributions of parents and children provide information of
a static nature: they represent the basis for analysing inequality and welfare
within generations. Take Figure 2 where parents have the same marginal dis-
tributions (therefore the same inequality) in mobility tables X and Y, while
the marginal distribution for children in Y is obtained from X by widening the
income gap, so that the child distribution in X Lorenz dominates that in Y.
Judging the child marginal distributions on static income inequality, one can
say that children's welfare is higher in X than in Y (Atkinson 1970). But how
general are welfare judgments based only on static inequality comparisons?
In tables W and Z of Figure 3 the marginal distributions for parents and for
children are the same as in X and Y, respectively, but with a dierent associa-
tion structure between parents' and children's positions. While the association
structures in the tables of Figure 2 are characterised by complete rigidity, the
formations of the social classes in the tables of Figure 3 are examples of sta-
tistical origin independence, characterised by full mixing with 50% of children
in each income class coming from poor parents and 50% coming from rich
parents.
Society W Society Z
Children Children
$600 $1000 $400 $1200
Parents
$200 5 5 10
Parents
$200 5 5 10
$600 5 5 10 $600 5 5 10
10 10 10 10
Fig. 3 Two tables with dierent static inequality and origin independence
Our questionnaire uses examples similar to those shown in these gures to
study how the welfare that people assign to dierent societies depends on the
extent of income inequality within the children's marginal distribution and
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on the strength of intergenerational interdependence between parents' and
children's positions.
In analysing a mobility table one has to consider two forms of interdepen-
dence occurring between the distributions P and C: structural mobility refers
to the comparison between parents' and children's marginal distributions of
incomes and is aected by the process of economic growth; exchange mobil-
ity is only concerned with the process of class transition, namely the degree
to which parents and children change their relative positions between income
classes. The importance of keeping separate these two notions of mobility has
been extensively documented (Rogo 1953, Duncan 1966, Goldthorpe 1980)
but, from a normative welfare perspective, the distinction between structural
and exchange mobility is more problematic. In particular, while the distinction
between the two is recognised conceptually (Markandya 1982), it is dicult to
decompose their eects in specic welfare measures (Fields and Ok 1999, p.
565). Welfare studies on intergenerational mobility typically focus on exchange
mobility, while the eect of structural mobility has attracted less interest.
Here we limit the possible role of structural mobility on welfare judgments
by comparing scenarios where marginal distributions can be dierent for at
most a dierent amount of inequality in the children's generation (as between
X and W, on the one side, and Y and Z, on the other). Moreover, we will
consider scenarios which maintain a symmetric conguration and where both
generations of parents and children are divided evenly between rich and poor.
With the latter restrictions the strength of association between parents and
children in a 2 2 mobility table can be measured directly by the proportion
of children which change their positions with respect to their parents, formally
the parameter m = 1   nii=ni. In a rigid society such as Figure 2 m = 0; in
a society with full mixing m = 0:5 (Figure 3); partial mixing (some positive
association) has 0 < m < 0:5.7
A change in intergenerational income dependence can have two opposing
eects on welfare: an increase in independence reduces inequality between
dynasties, but it also increases intertemporal uctuations of incomes within
dynasties (Atkinson 1981). Extending the theory of stochastic dominance to a
multidimensional context Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) have shown that
in a dynamic welfare framework which considers only these two eects of mo-
bility, the social optimum (for a mobility table with x marginal distributions)
collapses either to a case of complete rigidity or to one with full reversal.
An important limitation of this type of framework is that it does not rec-
ognize any special value to the case of full mixing (m = 0:5) although, from a
welfare perspective, this case has been taken as an indicator of equality of op-
7 Negative association, where 0:5 < m  1, is only of theoretical interest since real world
mobility data never show complete reversal between parents and children's economic posi-
tions; see Dardanoni et al. (2012) who show that the hypothesis of nonnegative association
cannot be rejected in almost all social mobility tables in 149 dierent countries and time
periods.
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portunity (Shorrocks 1978, Dardanoni 1993, Gottschalk and Spolaore 2002).8
Although the relation between preferences for income mobility and for income
equality has not received great attention in the welfare-measurement litera-
ture, within the general literature on distributive justice, the issue is a matter
of lively debate. There are three main views:
1. The substitution view.9 Origin independence should be the main objective
of a just society and a concern for income inequality should only receive
social concern if partial or complete rigidities cannot be fully removed.
According to this view, in the comparison between X and Y of Figure 2,
X might be socially preferred, since the greater static inequality for the
children marginal distribution in Y is inherited from parents; but in the
comparison between W and Z of Figure 3, Z should be preferred since
now, due to the condition of origin independence, the greater inequality
of the latter table is considered a sign of better opportunities  a land of
opportunities.
2. Priority for the worst o. Equality of opportunity and of outcome should be
considered on dierent ethical grounds and the degree of static inequality
in a society should always be kept at the minimum compatible with the
maximum level of income for the least well-o people (Rawls 1971). Under
this approach, X is better than Y in Figure 2 and W is better than Z in
Figure 3.
3. Intermediate position. In a well-organized society talents should be pro-
moted and this requires equality of opportunity. Often this idea is linked
to the role of incentives for economic eciency (Loury 1981), but in addi-
tion there may be fairness considerations that do not imply a substitution
between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. One may sup-
port the idea that rewards gained by individuals should be related to their
individual desert; but also that income inequality should be accepted only
to the extent it serves such a purpose.
Consider a comparison between X and Z, in addition to those between X
and Y and between W and Z. According to the substitution view, together with
X preferred to Y and Z to W, Z should also be preferred to X. On the other
hand, any theory which values equality but not mobility implies X preferred
to Y, W to Z, and X to Z. Someone who values both mobility and equality
may instead prefer X to Y, W to Z, but Z to X. The latter preferences indicate
8 For example, Shorrocks (1978) developed an axiomatic approach to mobility measure-
ment where an axiom is explicitly introduced which assigns maximum value to transition
matrices (a reduced form of mobility tables which do not give information on the marginal
distributions) with the least amount of predictability. Dardanoni (1993) presents a model
where children coming from parents in lower economic positions receive a higher weight in
the social evaluation than those coming from better positioned families: as he restricts at-
tention to tables with non-negative dependence, it follows that welfare is maximised, ceteris
paribus, by mobility tables with origin independence. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) also
develop a framework where a specic form of inequality aversion restricted to the children's
generation is shown to induce a strict preference for independence.
9 See Field and Ok's (1999) remark about Friedman (1962).
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that there may be an ethic which values both equality of opportunities and
equality of outcomes and which, therefore, entails a trade-o between the two
notions only in cases where more of one type of equality necessitates less of
the other.10
3 The Approach
Testing whether people value mobility in the abstract and whether there is a
trade-o in preference for equality and mobility is not simple. Empirical anal-
yses using eld data meet the problem that preference can be inferred, but not
directly tested. The same diculty emerges with experimental investigations.
Studies based on general social surveys also have problems investigating pure
distributive principles because of the diculty of maintaining control over the
various conceptual subtleties typically involved in distributional issues.11 A
complementary method, increasingly used in empirical social choice, is to con-
duct focused questionnaires using university students as participants (Gartner
and Schokkaert 2013 provide a review of the approach). Students are clearly
not representative of the general population and they are mainly chosen in this
kind of investigation for the fact that they are easily recruited. Nevertheless
it is reasonable to assume that students are suciently numerate and accus-
tomed to logical reasoning in order to make reasoned choice when faced with
abstract questions. In some instances this may be particularly important, not
to obtain fully representative results, but in order to inform theorists about
what other reasonable people think on complex issues and to avoid the risk
that theory becomes hostage of the conventions that accompany any academic
specialism (Amiel and Cowell 1992, p. 4).12 This objective may be especially
relevant with social mobility comparisons, given their multidimensional nature.
Another methodological issue concerns the fact that questionnaire studies
use hypothetical questions and do not provide nancial incentives for people
to answer truthfully. Proper nancial incentives are particularly important in
economic experiments to motivate subjects' behaviour in situations where self-
interest is at stake, as in laboratory games, markets, etc.. (Falk and Heck-
10 There are views that value neither equality nor mobility: according to Nozick (1974),
any inequality that has not been obtained by expropriation or exploitation can be justied.
11 An interesting recent method that tries to increase control in online survey
studies uses commercial platforms like Amazon Mechanichal Turk (Bohannon
2011). Up to now this method has been however used to conduct survey on
more practical issues, like political preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko
2013). Perhaps in the future, it may be interesting to explore the possibility
to apply the method also for conducting questionnaire focussed on abstract
principles.
12 Gartner and Schokkaert (2013) argue that in some cases students may also represent
a specically interesting subgroup of the population to focus on since they may be seen as
the future economic and political elite of the country and therefore in the position to aect
actual economic and social policy.
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Fig. 4 Example of a question display
man 2009).13 In the questionnaire studies the focus is on people's opinions
and their ethical preferences. It is not clear which nancial incentives would
be relevant in such a context. As previously remarked, a long tradition in the
theory of justice argues that ethical opinions on distributive matters should
be given from an impartial position. It is still true that without nancial in-
centives there may be inaccuracies in the answers by some respondents if the
questions are particularly dicult or the respondent is tired; but it is not ob-
vious why the majority of respondents should not try to answer carefully and
truthfully if the questions are suciently clear and students volunteer to par-
ticipate. Finally, if the participants give arbitrary, random or clearly unwise
responses, this should show up in the results.
3.1 The structure of the questionnaire
We took great eort to make the questionnaire simple and manageable. The
main part of the questionnaire consists of eight pair-wise comparisons designed
to investigate whether mobility is considered a desirable social objective in the
abstract. Each comparison presents a pair of scenarios A and B characterised
by dierent income proles as in the examples discussed in the previous sec-
tion; we use bus queue pictures (Amiel and Cowell 1999) to represent the
13 Even with regards to the role of incentives in experimental economics there is however
some debate; see Camerer and Hogarth 1999, for a classical article on the issue.
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two income groups within each generation of parents and children; dynasties
are identied by colour  see Figure 4. (In the example scenario A corresponds
to mobility table X of Section 2, B corresponds to mobility table Z). This com-
bines intuitively information about income inequality within each generation
and intergenerational mobility. Table 1 summarises the pair-wise comparisons
of the questionnaire. For each scenario the two numbers in round brackets
give the ratios between parents' and children's incomes for the group of poor
and rich, respectively: so (2; 2) means that both the poor group and the rich
group double their incomes from the xed parental levels of $200 and $600,
respectively. All the scenarios of the questionnaire are based either on (2; 2)
or on (3; 1:67). Thus, the total income in the scenarios of the eight pair-wise
comparisons are the same under both (2; 2) and (3; 1:67), though the scenarios
using (2; 2) are characterised by a widening of the inequality between the poor
and the rich. The number in square brackets is the parameter m of Section
2: the higher is m the more mixing there is in society and the greater is the
degree of intergenerational mobility. The questionnaire uses three values for
m: 50% (full mixing), 20% (partial mixing) and 0% (rigidity).
Table 1 Summary of the mobility scenarios on the questionnaire
Scenario A Scenario B
Question 1 (3; 1:67) (3; 1:67) full mix. v. rigidity
[50%] [0%]
Question 2 (3; 1:67) (2; 2) full mix. v. full mix.+widening
[50%] [50%]
Question 3 (3; 1:67) (2; 2) rigidity v. full mix.+widening
[0%] [50%]
Question 4 (3; 1:67) (3; 1:67) partial mix. v. rigidity
[20%] [0%]
Question 5 (3; 1:67) (2; 2) partial mix. v. partial mix.+widening
[20%] [20%]
Question 6 (3; 1:67) (2; 2) rigidity v. partial mix.+widening
[0%] [20%]
Question 7 (3; 1:67) (3; 1:67) full mix. v. partial mix.
[50%] [20%]
Question 8 (3; 1:67) (2; 2) rigidity v. rigidity+widening
[0%] [0%]
Comparing scenarios with dierent combinations of parameters can be used
to draw inferences on the various principles and ideas discussed above. Q1
shows two scenarios with the same inequality (no widening), but with mobil-
ity higher in A. Q4 and Q7 have a similar structure, but dierent values for
the mixing parameter. Thus, the three questions can be used to investigate
whether people value mobility as such, namely when mobility does not interfere
with static inequality. The answers to the three questions will show whether
more mobility induces stronger preference. In Q2, Q5 and Q8, mobility is the
same in both scenarios, but there is widening in the B scenarios; mobility of
the scenarios is higher in Q2 than in Q5 and Q8. Therefore, the answers to
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each individual question can be used to infer people's attitude towards static
income inequality; whereas comparing the distributions of answers across ques-
tions will be used to investigate the substitution view: whether more mobility
induces a lower support for income equality per se. Q3 and Q6 present scenar-
ios where both mobility and inequality are dierent: in Q3, A is a scenario with
rigidity and less inequality than in B, which is characterised by full mixing and
widening; Q6 is similar (B has partial mixing). Comparing the distributions of
answers between the two questions can provide evidence on people's willing-
ness to sacrice some income equality in order to obtain more income mobility,
an idea that we have suggested may be consistent with an ethic of meritocracy.
Evidence on the same notion can also be obtained comparing the answers to
Q3 and Q6 with those in Q8, which compares two rigid scenarios and where
B has more inequality (widening). By contrast, persistent preferences for A in
the three questions would be consistent with a strict egalitarianism. Partici-
pants were asked to indicate which scenario they considered socially preferable
from an impartial position.14
3.2 The samples
The questionnaires were completed in 2009 and 2010 by a total of 356 univer-
sity students. They were from three home institutions of the authors, namely
the University of Venice (Italy), LSE (UK), and Ruppin Academic Center
(Israel): 120, 89 and 147 participants, respectively. The questionnaire was ad-
ministered at the end of lectures. Students were informed about the possibility
of participating in a questionnaire and were told that participation was volun-
tary. Answering the full questionnaire required about 20 minutes. All students
were upper-level undergraduates, in most cases with economics as their main
subject, but with no specic teaching in the theory of income mobility. Using
as respondents students at about the similar stage in education but from dif-
ferent countries allows one to address the question of the impact of cultural
background on perception and evaluation of mobility. This will be done be-
low using some further information on the characteristics of the participants
collected at the end of the questionnaire. First we present the preferences ex-
pressed by participants in the pair-wise comparisons, focusing on ve major
issues.
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Table 2 Results in Q1, Q4, Q7
Valid Preference Preference Indif./ d-test 2-test
resp. for A for B not comp.
Q1 Percentages
Italy 120 60.8% 22.5% 16.7% 4.50 11.05
UK 89 77.5% 7.9% 14.6% 7.00
Israel 147 70.1% 19.7% 10.2% 6.53
ALL 356 68.8% 17.7% 13.5% 10.31 
Q4
Italy 120 56.7% 31.7% 11.7% 2.82 20.64
UK 89 84.3% 7.9% 7.9% 7.40
Israel 146 66.7% 20.4% 12.9% 6.10
ALL 355 67.7% 21.1% 11.0% 9.28 
Q7
Italy 119 68.3% 22.5% 9.2% 5.17 4.87
UK 89 68.5% 16.9% 14.6% 5.162
Israel 147 70.1% 15.0% 15.0% 7.33
ALL 356 69.1% 18.0.7% 12.6% 10.28 
Notes: d-test is a dierence-of-proportion test for H0 : p(A) = p(B), based on the
standard normal approximation of the binomial distribution. 2-test is for the null
hypothesis that answers in Italy, UK, and Israel can be viewed as if drawn from the
same population. , , , denote rejection at, 10%, 5%, and 1% signicance levels.
4 Results
1. Do people show support for mobility? If a person values mobility as such
then he should choose response A in Q1 (Full Mixing versus Rigidity), Q4
(Partial mixing v rigidity) and Q7 (Full v Partial Mixing). Table 2 reports
the answers to the three questions as a percentage of each country sub-sample
and in the aggregate (ALL). The second column gives the number of valid
responses for each question and in each country: there were very few non-
responses. In all countries the majority of subjects report a preference for A
in all three questions. A dierence-of-proportion tests (column d -test) con-
rms that the dierences are statistically signicant in all the comparisons.
Therefore, we conclude that participants indeed value mobility in all the three
countries. 2-tests reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity in Q1 and Q4,
while homogeneity is accepted in Q7. The results of the tests are consistent
14 Impartial position means that the individual whose preferences are considered is not
directly involved in the distributions of income in the society. This was explained in the in-
troduction to the questionnaire, which also explained other features, including the fact that
the questionnaire is about social preferences for the distributions of incomes in hypothetical
societies of two generations, the generation of the parents and the generation of the children;
the fact there are dierent dimensions which may be involved in considering income distribu-
tions; the way in which displays have to be looked at and interpreted. The full questionnaire
is available at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/resources/questionnaires/MobilityQuestionnaireWelfare.pdf
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with the evidence that in Q1 and in Q4, there are higher proportions of choices
for A, hence stronger preferences for mobility, in the UK than in Israel and
in Italy. This interesting piece of evidence will be examined in more detail
studying the eect of personal factors.
2. Does more mobility elicit stronger preference? A second issue can be ad-
dressed by comparing the answers to Q1, Q4 and Q7: whether more mobility
induces stronger preferences or whether preferences for mobility do not de-
pend on the degree of mobility. In the former case, we should expect that the
proportions of choice for A in Q1 are higher than in both Q4 and Q7. We do
not see any such systematic tendency: looking at simple percentages, A in Q1
is chosen more often than A in Q4 in Italy and Israel, but not in the UK; and
it is chosen more often than A in Q7 in the UK, but not in Italy nor Israel
(where A is Q1 is chosen as often as in Q7). To obtain further evidence on
the issue, Table 3 shows the bivariate distributions of preferences expressed
by participants in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7). Since we did not nd any signicant
dierence over the pairs across samples, here the reported percentages are for
the full data set of the three countries. The percentages conrm that the ma-
jority of participants choosing A in Q1, also chose A in Q4 and Q7; moreover,
the percentages for the other categories do not show any tendency to switch
from A to B (or to indierence) between Q1 and Q4 and Q7.
Table 3 Distributions of answers in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7)
Q4 Q7
A B Indi. A B Indi.
Q1 A 53.8% 10.4% 4.5% Q1 A 54.1% 9.3% 5.6%
B 7.6% 8.5% 1.7% B 7.6% 7.3% 2.5%
Indi. 6.5% 2.3% 4.8% Indi. 7.6% 1.4% 4.5%
3. Do people show support for income equality? Questionnaire experiments
have been used before to investigate preferences for equality:15 the dierence
here is that preference for static equality may conict with preference for mo-
bility. In our questionnaire a person who values equality should choose response
A in Q2 (Full mixing and widening), Q5 (Partial mixing and widening) and
Q8 (Rigidity v simple widening). The answers to the three questions reported
in Table 4 show that in all three countries the majority of subjects do indeed
15 In general, previous questionnaires conducted to investigate people's attitude towards
income inequality took the form of a test of the classical Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers
(Amiel and Cowell 1992; Amiel and Cowell 1998, Harrison and Seidl 1994, Bernasconi 2002,
Traub and Schmidt 2009). Support for the principle depends on the range of the income
distribution in which income transfers occur, on the type of verbal or numerical test con-
ducted, on the frames adopted to test it (e.g. whether from a external observer viewpoint,
under a condition similar to the veil of ignorance, or under one of individual risk)  Amiel
(1999), Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
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value equality (they prefer A). Moreover, the dierences in proportion between
preferences for A and for B are highly signicant (d -test) and the patterns are
homogeneous across the three countries (2-test).
Table 4 Results in Q2, Q5, Q8
Valid Preference Preference Indif./ d-test 2-test
resp. for A for B not comp.
Q2 Percentages
Italy 120 67.5% 16.7% 15.8% 5.97 2.64
UK 89 76.4% 14.6% 9.0% 6.00
Israel 147 71.4% 16.3% 12.2% 7.22
ALL 356 71.3% 16.0% 12.6% 11.11 
Q5
Italy 120 68.3% 15.8% 15.8% 6.17 2.66
UK 89 77.5% 13.5% 9.0% 6.21
Israel 147 72.8% 14.3% 12.9% 7.69
ALL 356 72.5% 14.6% 12.9% 11.64 
Q8
Italy 120 70.8% 13.3% 15.8% 6.76 4.47
UK 88 80.9% 10.1% 9.0% 6.89
Israel 147 78.9% 10.2% 10.9% 8.91
ALL 355 76.7% 11.2% 11.8% 13.11 
4 Does mobility preference reduce support for equality? A person with the
substitution view should switch preferences from A to B going from Q8 (zero
mobility) to Q5 (partial mobility) and to Q2 (perfect mobility, where the B
response should be strictly preferred). So the large proportion of A preferences
for all three questions in Table 4 suggests that a majority of respondents reject
the substitution view; however, there is a moderate tendency of the frequencies
of B answers to increase moving from Q8, to Q5 and to Q2 in all the three sam-
ples. The dierence-of-proportions test reveals some low signicance only in
the aggregate data for the dierence between Q8 and Q2 (with the proportions
of B answers increasing from 11.2% to 16.0%, d = 1:625, one-tailed p < 10%),
but not between Q8 and Q5, nor between Q5 and Q2. Table 5 shows the joint
distributions of choices over (Q2,Q5), (Q2,Q8) and (Q5,Q8) which strengthen
the evidence that the majority of subjects chose (A,A) over all the three pairs
of questions, but conrm the moderate tendency of switching preferences from
A to B in going from Q8 to Q2 and Q5.16 The substitution view is rejected
by the majority, but may hold for a small minority of respondents.
16 This can be veried comparing the proportions of answers of type (B,A) in (Q2,Q8) and
(Q5,Q8), with those of type (A,B) which are consistent with an opposite tendency. While
the proportions of the latter patterns are very small, the former are larger, with dierences
that are statistically signicant. In particular, in (Q2,Q8) the proportion of answers (B,A)
16 Yoram Amiel et al.
Table 5 Distributions of answers in (Q2,Q5), (Q2,Q8), (Q5,Q8)
Q5 Q8
A B Indi. A B Indi.
Q2 A 62.1% 5.3% 3.4% Q2 A 63.4% 3.7% 4.2%
B 5.9% 7.0% 3.1% B 8.5% 5.6% 2.0%
Indi. 4.5% 2.3% 5.9% Indi. 5.1% 2.0% 5.6%
Q5 A 65.6% 2.3% 4.5%
B 5.9% 6.8% 2.0%
Indi. 5.4% 2.3% 5.4%
5 Are people willing to sacrice some equality for more mobility? The ac-
ceptance of an equality-mobility trade-o may arise when some inequality is
necessary for greater mobility, as in a meritocracy. The answers to Q3 (Rigid-
ity v Mixing+Widening), Q6 (Rigidity v Partial Mixing+Widening), and Q8
(Rigidity v Simple widening) provide evidence here. The results are consis-
tent with the trade-o if response B in Q3 is chosen more often than in Q6,
which in turn is chosen more often than in Q8.17 The evidence in Table 6 is
consistent with the trade-o: in all three samples, the response A decreases,
while response B increases sharply moving from Q8 to Q6 and then to Q3.
The dierence of proportions of response B between the three questions are
highly signicant.18 It is also interesting to remark that, while in Q8 and Q3
the majority of responses are for A (see the d-test), in Q3 (where there is
full mixing in B) choices are divided evenly between A and B. The preference
patterns are similar across countries (2-test).
The trade-o evidence is supported by the joint distributions over (Q3,Q6),
(Q3,Q8) and (Q6,Q8) in Table 7: while in all the three pairs the relative majori-
ties of choices are for (A,A), there are also a substantial proportion of (B,A)
is 8.5% (30/355) and those of type (A,B) is 3.7% (13/355) (d = 2:76, one-tailed p < 1%);
in (Q5,Q8) the answers (B,A) are 5.9% (21/355) and those of type (A,B) is 2.3% (8/355)
(d = 2:6, one-tailed p < 1%). Instead, there is no signicance dierence in the frequencies
of (A,B) and (B,A) answers in (Q2,Q5).
17 An alternative hypothesis here is that people do not switch preferences between the
three questions, and in particular that they choose in Q3 and Q6 the same scenario A as
in Q8. For example, a prediction of no trade-o would hold either for individuals who do
not care about mobility, or for those who consider the greater inequality of scenario B in
the three questions anyhow too high to be compensated for any amount of mobility (even
when mobility is perfect as in B of Q3).
18 For the aggregate sample the increases in response B are: +23.2% (35.4%-
11.2%=126/353-40/355) between Q6 and Q8 (d = 6:597, one-tailed p < 1%); +39.0%
(49.2%-11.2%=159/356-40/355) between Q3 and Q8 (d = 8:365, one-tailed p < 1%); +13.8%
(49.2%-35.4%=159/356-126/353) between Q3 and Q6 (d = 1:896, one-tailed p < 5%);
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Table 6 Results in Q3, Q6, Q8
Valid Preference Preference Indif. d-test 2-test
resp. for A for B not comp.
Q3 Percentages
Italy 119 45.0% 49.2% 5.8% -0.56 3.19
UK 89 50.6% 40.4% 9.0% 0.89
Israel 147 46.9% 43.5% 9.5% 0.52
ALL 355 47.2% 44.7% 7.9% 0.44
Q6
Italy 118 54.2% 35.8% 10.0% 2.02 0.41
UK 88 57.3% 34.8% 7.9% 2.10
Israel 147 55.8% 35.4% 8.8% 2.68
ALL 353 55.6% 35.4% 8.1% 3.94 
Q8
Italy 120 70.8% 13.3% 15.8% 6.76 4.47
UK 88 80.9% 10.1% 9.0% 6.89
Israel 147 78.9% 10.2% 10.9% 8.91
ALL 355 76.7% 11.2% 11.8% 13.11 
Table 7 Distributions of answers in (Q3,Q6), (Q3,Q8), (Q6,Q8)
Q6 Q8
A B Indi. A B Indi.
Q3 A 37.2% 7.7% 2.6% Q3 A 39.6% 3.1% 4.5%
B 15.6% 25.6% 3.4% B 31.9% 6.5% 6.5%
Indi. 3.1% 2.3% 5.4% Indi. 5.7% 1.4% 0.9%
Q6 A 48.6% 3.7% 3.7%
B 22.2% 6.8% 6.8%
Indi. 6.5% 0.6% 1.1%
responses.19 Moreover, in (Q3,Q6) more than a quarter of the respondents
choose (B,B), the scenarios with more mobility.
5 The role of personal factors
It is potentially interesting to know the personal traits that appear to pre-
dispose respondents to certain choices. Table 8 reports the actual personal
information from the end of the questionnaire. In general we do not observe
large dierences in the average answers across the three samples. One impor-
tant dierence is that, while all students in Israel and the majority in Italy are
19 As above, in order to determinate the statistical signicance of patterns (BA), they can
be contrasted with the symmetric patterns (A,B). The comparison show that: in (Q3,Q6),
category (B,A) corresponds to 15.6% (55/352) versus 7.7% (27/352) of (A,B) (d = 3:20,
one-tailed p < 1%); in (Q3,Q8) answers (BA) are 31.9% (113/354) and those (A,B) are
3.1% (8/354) (d = 9:25, one-tailed p < 1%); in (Q6,Q8), (BA) count for 22.1% (78/352) and
(A,B) for 3.7% (13/352) (d = 6:92, one-tailed p < 1%).
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from their respective country, most students in the UK are from abroad (A3).
As indicated in the Introduction, in recent years various studies have shown
that preferences for redistributions vary systematically across countries and
cultures (e.g. Corneo and Grüner 2002, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Alesina
and Giuliano 2011, Luttmer and Singhal 2011, and references there). Clearly,
our samples are by no means representative of the populations of the three
countries and therefore our purpose here is not that of conducting a study of
preference for redistributions and social mobility across countries. Rather our
aim is to study whether people's preferences given in the questionnaire can
be explained by any personal factors such as attitudes and attributes of the
respondents, including their cultural backgrounds or other characteristics of
the samples collected.
Regarding our samples, specic cultural eects may be due to family ties.
There is in this respect a rather large literature showing that Italy is an in-
stance of the Southern European culture characterised by very strong family
ties which may have implications for people's attitudes towards mobility and
inequality (Esping-Andersen 1999, Alesina and Giuliano 2013). On the one
hand, family ties imply a tendency of individuals in these societies to rely
on various forms of social insurance provided within the family which may
reduce people's demand for social mobility. On the other hand, altering the
probability of success in the labor market, family ties can increase people's
preferences for income equality and their demand for redistributive policies.
Northern European countries, including UK, are often considered to express
a dierent culture, where family ties are less important and where social mo-
bility is valued higher.20 Moreover in these countries success in the labour
market is generally viewed as a result of hard work and willpower, rather than
luck and others factors beyond the control of the individual. The latter atti-
tude may partly translate in a lower concern for income equality, as has been
recently demonstrated in the UK (Georgiadis and Manning 2012). Israel is
also an interesting country: for some respects it is often considered culturally
similar to Mediterranean European countries, including for what it concerns
people attitude towards inequality (Olivera 2013); nevertheless evidence also
indicates that in Israel there is more mobility and more inequality than in a
typical Southern European country (Breen and Luijkx 2004).
There is also an extensive literature studying the relationships between
social mobility and ethnic diversity, but its relevance for the sub-sample of
students in our questionnaire who have moved abroad to study is limited.21
20 As is well known, an even stronger attitude for mobility associated with lower preferences
for income equality has been especially found in non-European Anglo-Saxon countries like
the US, Australia and New Zealand (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Alesina and Giuliano
2011).
21 Indeed, most of the literature on diverse ethnicity and social mobility has focused on
the eect of belonging to certain social classes and attitudes toward out-groups and how
mobility may aect and may be aected by this relationships, for example for the impact
that immigrants may have for the degree of mobility in a society and from here the attitude
towards ethnic out-groups between dierent social classes. There are also studies that have
investigated preferences for redistribution between immigrants. An interesting nding here
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By contrast we note that the evidence from social surveys generally shows that
more educated individuals prefer less redistribution than other segments of
the population. This is generally explained with the trade-o argument that
higher education decreases preferences for income equality because it raises
expectations of mobility in the future (Alesina and Giuliano 2011). Based on
the argument, it could then be that students who go abroad to study and
reveal in this a particularly strong expectation from the return on education,
may have even stronger preferences for mobility and lower for income equality.
Obviously, other dierences between the three samples may depend on
the specic institutions where we conducted the questionnaire and be partly
revealed in the average values of the other attributes reported in Table 8.
In all three data sets, most respondents perceive that their family income
is high (F1) and just above the country average (F2). This feature is more
pronounced in the UK sample.22 The majority of respondents in all the three
samples believe that they will improve on their parents' economic (P1) and
social positions (P2). When faced with values attached to mobility, respondents
generally agree that independence between parents' and children's income is
a desirable property for society (V1) and that income independence is a sign
of equality of opportunities (V2). There is slightly less agreement and clear
evidence whether the majority support the view that the government's main
duty to ensure equality of opportunities or rather that of reducing as much
as possible income inequality (V3): on this issue respondents in Italy and
Israel are typically half way between the extremes; in the UK there is a slight
majority favouring equality of opportunity.
We constructed two individual preference indices: for any respondent mo-
bility preference is the number of A responses on Q1, Q4 and Q7; for any
respondent equality preference is the number of A responses on Q2, Q5 and
Q8. Table 9 shows the distributions of respondents across the four possible cat-
egories of response and conrms that the majority of respondents value both
mobility and equality: for both variables, there are very few 0A; for mobility
preference category 3A is the most favoured (although there are dierences
in pattern across the samples); equality preference category 3A commands an
absolute majority in all the three samples. Table 10 presents the results of
three specications of an ordered probit regression for each of the two pref-
erence variables with the attributes and attitudes of Table 9 as independent
variables (the correlation matrix of the variables is reported in the Appendix).
In the baseline mobility-preference regression only V1 (independence of
parents and children's income in society) is signicant: as one would expect,
those who agree that independence is desirable value mobility higher; but we
do not see any eect on mobility preference from the role of independence
is that the eect of the culture of the country of origin is stronger on attitudes towards
redistribution than the eect of the characteristics of the country of destination (Luttmer
and Singhal 2011).
22 It is nevertheless worthwhile to remark that there is no signicant correlation between
family income (F1) and the nationality of the respondents (A1), see correlation matrix in
the Appendix (not even within the UK sample where the correlation is -0.069).
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Table 8 Sample characteristics
Italy UK Israel All
Number of respondents 120 89 147 356
Personal attributes
A1. Age 20.1 21.0 24.6 22.5
A2. Gender (0 male, 1 female) 0.54 0.40 0.46 0.47
A3. Nationality (1 if from country; 0 otherwise) 0.93 0.27 1.00 0.80
Family attributes
F1. Family income (1 very low; ...; 5 very high) 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.2
F2. Family income relative to country average 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.4
(1 much lower;...; 5 much higher)
Prospects
P1. Prospective income relative to parental income (1 much
lower;...; 5 much higher)
3.4 4.0 3.9 3.8
P2. Prospective social position relative to parental position (1
much lower;...; 5 much higher)
3.5 3.7 3.7 3.6
Values
V1. Is independence of parents' and children's income levels
desirable? (1 strongly agree;..; 5 strongly disagree)
2.3 2.0 2.2 2.2
V2. Is independence of parents' and children's income levels
equivalent to equality of opportunity?
2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9
(1 strongly agree;...; 5 strongly disagree)
V3. Should the government: a. provide equality of opportunity
and not alter economic outcomes; or b. reduce income dier-
ences as much as possible?
4.8 3.5 5.2 4.6
(1 strongly agree with a.; 10 strongly agree with b.)
Table 9 Mobility and equality preferences - distributions by category
0A 1A 2A 3A 0A 1A 2A 3A
Mobility preference Equality preference
Italy 10.8 24.2 33.3 31.7 16.7 10.0 23.3 50.0
UK 9.0 11.2 20.2 59.6 13.5 6.7 11.2 68.5
Israel 10.9 16.3 27.9 44.9 9.5 14.3 19.7 56.5
ALL 10.4 17.7 27.8 44.1 12.9 11.0 18.8 57.3
as equality of opportunities (V2) nor of the view regarding whether the gov-
ernment should provide equality of opportunities or reduce income dierences
(V3). In the baseline equality-preference regression family income has a posi-
tive eect, which may be interpreted as an altruistic attitude of those perceiv-
ing themselves as better-o. Also, participants perceiving better prospects of
moving upwards in the social parade are less inclined to value income equality
higher than those who perceive to have lower prospects (P2). This result can
be seen as consistent with arguments sometimes used in the political economic
literature to explain why the poor do not always support real world redistribu-
tive policy if they perceive that they can be in a better economic position in
the future (Benabou and Ok 2001), but there may also be some deeper factors
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Table 10 Ordered probit for the role of personal factors
Baseline regression
Mobility preference Equality preference
A1. Age 0.0062 (0.025) 0.0440 (0.027)
A2. Gender -0.1638 (0.1257) -0.1005 (0.131)
F1. Family income 0.0271 (0.117) 0.2514 (0.125)
F2. Living standard -0.0311 (0.111) -0.0879 (0.117)
P1. Prospect on income 0.0212 (0.093) 0.0368 (0.099)
P2. Prospect. on soc. position -0.0349 (0.103) -0.2068 (0.109)
V1. Indep. desirable -0.3152 (0.077) -0.0130 (0.081)
V2. Indep. as equ. of opport. -0.1148 (0.081) 0.0114 (0.085)
V3. Equ. opport. v. equ. income 0.0102 (0.026) -0.0655 (0.028)
Regression with country dummies
Mobility preference Equality preference
A1. Age 0.0223 (0.035) 0.0762 (0.039)
A2. Gender -0.1460 (0.127) -0.0709 (0.133)
F1. Family income -0.0408 (0.120) 0.2419 (0.128)
F2. Living standard -0.0822 (0.112) -0.0978 (0.118)
P1. Prospect on income -0.0697 (0.100) 0.0311 (0.106)
P2. Prospect. on soc. position -0.0117 (0.104) -0.2044 (0.109)
V1. Indep. desirable -0.3128 (0.077) -0.0068 (0.081)
V2. Indep. as equ. of opport. -0.0984 (0.082) 0.0049 (0.087)
V3. Equ. opport. v. equ. income 0.0255 (0.027) -0.0583 (0.028)
Italy -0.1356 (0.207) 0.1678 (0.222)
UK 0.5029 (0.211) 0.3298 (0.224)
Regression with nationality
Mobility preference Equality preference
A1. Age 0.0209 (0.036) 0.0808 (0.039)
A2. Gender -0.1466 (0.127) -0.0700 (0.133)
A3. Nationality -0.0547 (0.255) 0.1793 (0.264)
F1. Family income -0.0394 (0.121) 0.2342 (0.129)
F2. Living standard -0.0850 (0.113) -0.0883 (0.119)
P1. Prospect on income -0.0700 (0.101) 0.0318 (0.106)
P2. Prospect. on soc. position -0.0126 (0.104) -0.2016 (0.110)
V1. Indep. desirable -0.3132 (0.077) -0.0063 (0.081)
V2. Indep. as equ. of opport. -0.0983 (0.081) 0.0047 (0.087)
V3. Equ. opport. v. equ. income 0.0251 (0.027) -0.0571 (0.028)
Italy -0.1439 (0.210) 0.1949 (0.225)
UK 0.4580 (0.297) 0.4772 (0.312)
Legend: Standard errors in brackets. Stars , , , denote rejection at, 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels.
weakening preferences for income equality, independent of material interest.23
The regression also shows that participants who value equality higher seem
those to be who agree that government should care about equality of op-
portunities more than to equality of income (V3). The eect is small, but
opposite to what one might have found more intuitive. However, ev-
idence that people are unsupportive towards policies to redistribute
incomes even when they care about economic inequality has also
23 Supporting this interpretation note the negative eect of prospect on social position
(P2) rather than the prospect on income (P1), which also has a negative eect. Removing
P2 from the regression makes P1 not signicant.
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been documented in policy surveys (Bartels 2005, ). For example,
in a recent study Kuzmienenko et al. (2013) show that information
on inequality increases substantially people concern about inequal-
ity, but it has a very little eect on their support for redistributive
policies. As a major explanation they nd that people dont trust the
ability of governments to reduce inequality through standard policy
instruments. We return to the point in the conclusion of the paper.
The second regression uses country dummies (Israel is the base case). The
results for mobility preference show a positive and signicant impact of the
dummy for UK; the dummy for Italy is negative, even if it is not signicant.
Based on the previous discussion, the results are not totally unexpected even if
it is interesting the similarity between Italy and Israel. There are no eects of
the country dummy in the regression on equality preference. The results here
are perhaps slightly less expected. Based on the discussion at the beginning of
this section and on the evidence on V3 in Table 9, one might have expected
a negative eect of the UK: the eect is positive (even if not signicant),
indicating that there is no trade-o in the UK sample between mobility and
equality preferences.
The third regression includes a nationality dummy. This is constructed
from the response to question 3 (Do you consider yourself ...? + multiple
nationality categories); in eect it is coded as though the question were do
you consider yourself from round here? taking value 1 (Yes) or 0 (No). The
eect is negative, even if not signicant. It is nevertheless interesting that the
dummy for the UK is now no longer signicant,24 conrming that a relevant
contribution for the mobility preferences in the UK sample derives from those
students who have literally moved from overseas to study.
6 Concluding discussion
Do people value mobility? Clearly, yes. Is mobility enough? Clearly, no. Ac-
cording to our respondents, if there is greater mobility in society then that is a
good thing; but it does not mean that you can forget about equality (Table 5).
The evidence shows that the majority of our respondents value positively both
mobility and equality: not only do they reject the extreme position that treats
income equality as the only mandatory welfare objective, they also reject the
position that considers income mobility as a primary social goal with income
equality representing only a concern when the rst objective cannot be fully
achieved.
Why do people value mobility? When mobility is accompanied by income
growth then they are prepared to sacrice equality: this is evident from Ta-
ble 6. Although there is no simple, direct trade-o between income mobility
and income equality, respondents express willingness to sacrice some income
equality to obtain more income mobility (or vice-versa) when this is necessary.
24 The regression obviously reports the dierence between Israel and the UK; the dierence
between Italy and the UK remains statistically signicant (at p  0:02).
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We found no evidence of personal factors that have both a positive eect
in the evaluation of mobility and a negative eect on the evaluation of income
equality (or vice-versa). Family income aects preferences for equality posi-
tively, while a prospect of social improvement aect them negatively. There
is some evidence of cross country dierences in the evaluation of mobility: re-
spondents in the UK value it the most; those in Italy value it the least. Those
who have moved to attend their course of study also value mobility.
Although the questionnaire does not address explicit policy is-
sues (neither it was intended to do), our results contain some points
of interest also in terms of ongoing policy discussions. Indeed, closely
related to the substitution view, there is an ever growing emphasis
of some more right-wing economic literature on the role of talents,
merits, incentives, both as the main/only factors which should deter-
mine people rewards and as the main drivers of countries economic
performance. An important policy question arising from the posi-
tion is whether ex-post inequality should remain a matter for policy
concern or whether governments should address their eort to cor-
rect ex-ante inequality of opportunity, including that due to family
background often considered as the major obstacle to the reward of
talents and the full eectiveness of economic incentives.
The evidence we nd against the substitution speaks also against
a policy objective only oriented to level the playing eld and make
the economic success unpredictable of the basis of family back-
ground. Income inequality remains a major concern for the subjects
participating in our study, even when the position of an individual
is (statistically) independent from that of parents. Nevertheless, our
subjects, even those with stronger preferences for income equality,
do not seem particularly supportive of a policy objective by which
a governments main duty is that of reducing income dierences as
much as possible (as shown by the evidence on V3 in the ordered
probit regressions).
While this result may surprise at rst, there is obviously a dier-
ence between valuing income equality and supporting policies that
redistribute incomes directly. A government can indeed pursue dif-
ferent policies to promote economic equality, partly also depending
on the actual relationships between static inequality and intergener-
ational mobility. In the present study we have focussed on a trade-o
between equality and mobility mainly because we were interested
on key distributional principles. There are, however, empirical stud-
ies indicating that countries with more statistic inequality are often
those with less intergenerational mobility (Corak 2013). This rela-
tionship has been recently called the Great Gatsby curve. While
there are controversies on the interpretation of the relationship, a
possibility is that equality and mobility are in fact the two sides of
the same coin. For example, according to the OECD rising economic
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inequality can stie upward social mobility, making it harder for tal-
ented and hard-working people to get the rewards they deserve.
Clearly, according to this view, policies to contrast inequality are
tide to those capable to increase mobility. Moreover, some people
may judge a public policy to promote equality of opportunity also
more eective to reduce economic inequality, rather than redistribu-
tive policies based on classical tax and income transfer programs.
Fuelling the latter position there may for example be standard ef-
ciency considerations or more political ones, like a lack of trust of
many people in the ability of the governments to conduct traditional
redistributive policies.25
The latter tendency has for example been reported in a recent
survey conducted by Kuziemko et al. (2013), which is more explic-
itly focussed on people political attitudes towards representative
redistributive policies. The study of these authors is interesting also
because it uses a cheap online platform like Amazon Mechanical
Turk to conduct a large randomized survey. This permits to the au-
thors to manipulate directly the survey and to ask more complex
and focussed questions than is normally allowed by the expensive
surveys conducted or commissioned to commercial vendors.
As emphasized at several points in this paper, investigating val-
ues concerning intergenerational mobility presents an even stronger
challenge than focussing only on inequality because of the multidi-
mensional nature of mobility and because individuals' responses in
real-world contexts may be motivated by personal interest and ex-
perience. The questionnaire approach we have implemented allows
one to make precise the appraisal of the abstract preferences for
inequality and mobility through a series of linked pair-wise compar-
isons. We have used students as sample in our investigation. Stu-
dents are not representative of the populations. They have oered
an interesting initial evidence of the way in which reasonable peo-
ple perceive subtile ethical issues which are usually discussed only
among specialists. In the future it may be important to combine an
approach like that followed by Kuziemko et al. (2013) with ours, to
investigate further and on a larger scale people ethical preferences
for inequality and mobility and analyse with a better understanding
how people abstract preferences for inequality and mobility feed into
their practical judgments for representative policy instruments.
25 We just remark that the objective of a policy designed to increase social
mobility for equality considerations remains substantially dierent that one mo-
tivated by the substitution view. In the former case a government may indeed
go even further than simply levelling the playing eld. For example, it may
decide to favour a group of particularly disadvantage people and spend to oer
them some high-quality public service in an amount greater than the average,
in order to speed up the process of their economic integration.
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